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“Sin taxes” are high on the political agenda in the global fight against obesity. Ac-
cording to theory, they are welfare improving if consumers with low self-control are at
least as price responsive as consumers with high self-control, even in the absence of ex-
ternalities. In this paper, we investigate if consumers with low and high self-control react
di↵erently to sin tax variation. For identification, we exploit two sets of sin tax reforms
in Denmark: first, the increase of the soft drink tax in 2012 and its repeal in 2014 and,
second, the fat tax introduction in 2011 and its repeal in 2013. We assess the purchase
response empirically using a detailed homescan household panel. Our unique dataset com-
prises a survey measure of self-control linked to the panelists, which we use to divide the
sample into consumers with low and high levels of self-control. We find that consumers
with low self-control reduce purchases less strongly than consumers with high self-control
when taxes go up, but increase purchases to a similar extent when taxes go down. Hence,
we document an asymmetry in the responsiveness to increasing and decreasing prices.
We find empirical and theoretical support that habit formation shapes the di↵erential
response by self-control. The results suggest that price instruments are not an e↵ective
tool for targeting self-control problems.
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1 Introduction
The “global obesity epidemic” is a major public health challenge (WHO, 2000) and a leading
risk factor for many non-communicable diseases like type 2 diabetes and coronary heart
disease (Smith Jr., 2007). Poor diets that contain high levels of sugar and fat are among
the main culprits of this phenomenon (Finkelstein et al., 2005). Hence, the World Health
Organization advises governments to consider the introduction of so-called “sin taxes” on
unhealthy foods, e.g. taxes on sugar sweetened beverages (SSB). A number of countries
have already implemented taxes on sugary beverages and other unhealthy foods, e.g. France,
Mexico, the United Kingdom, and, until 2014, Denmark.
There are two rationales for sin taxes: externalities and internalities. Externalities mean
that sugar consumers do not take the social costs of adverse health behavior into account and
the tax is meant to internalize these costs. Internalities in the form of self-control problems
imply that people underappreciate the long-term health costs that an unhealthy diet has on
themselves. In this paper, we focus on the internality argument since it dominates the public
debate about sin taxes on foods.1 The idea is that a sin tax could help consumers with
low self-control to follow their long-run utility by increasing the instantaneous costs. Such a
tax can even be welfare-improving if the corrective gains for individuals with low self-control
overweigh the distortionary costs for those without self-control problems. However, to ensure
that this is the case, individuals with low self-control must reduce their purchases at least as
much as those with high self-control (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006; Haavio and Kotakorpi,
2011).
In this paper, we investigate empirically the e↵ect of self-control on responsiveness to sin
tax changes. For identification, we exploit exogenous variation in two Danish sin taxes: First,
we consider the increase of the soft drink tax in 2012 and its complete repeal in 2014. Second,
we investigate the fat tax on saturated fat, introduced in 2011 and repealed in 2013. We
use a unique panel data set that comprises purchase records of around 1,300 households who
stay in the panel for the period of tax changes and who have also answered a well established
survey on self-control (Tangney et al., 2004). Using the survey, we stratify the sample into
high and low self-control consumers. Consumers with low self-control have larger body mass
index and report both the intention to reduce their weight and to improve their eating habits.
In our empirical analysis, we estimate the di↵erential e↵ect of tax changes on consumers with
low and high self-control.
1First, soft drink taxes are often advocated based on the premise that, in particular, children, who are
among the heaviest soft drinks consumers, ignore the long-run consequences of high sugar intake (Dubois
et al., 2019). Second, the e↵ectiveness of these taxes is usually assessed by the reduction in consumption and
not by tax revenue raised (for externality correction this distinction would not be as relevant). For example,
on March 13, 2018, the former British finance minister and initiator of the British soft drink tax, George
Osborne, tweeted: “In OBR [O ce for Budget Responsibility] report today is news that our Sugar Tax is even
more e↵ective than hoped. Expected receipts halved [...]”. (https://twitter.com/George_Osborne/status/
973647500551827456, retrieved 09/23/19).
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In response to the soft drink tax hike, we find that consumers with low self-control reduce
their purchases by only 7 percent and significantly less than those with high self-control who
reduce their purchases by 21 percent. In contrast, in response to the soft drink tax repeal,
consumers with high and low self-control increase their purchases to a similar extent, between
26 and 28 percent. We find a similar pattern for the introduction and repeal of the fat tax.
Here, we look at butter since it experienced substantial tax variation due to its high content
of saturated fat. The credibility of our empirical strategy is underscored by parallel pre-
tax trends between self-control groups and placebo tests. We demonstrate robustness of the
results by performing permutation tests, in which we randomly reshu✏e the categorization
in high and low self-control, and by varying the sample split.
We assess a range of alternative explanations for the di↵erential response by self-control.
We find that the coe cient of self-control remains stable when including measures for ed-
ucation, nutritional knowledge, income, and preferences for unhealthy food. These findings
suggest that the di↵erential response is not driven by correlations with one of these variables.
Employing the bounding approach of Oster (2019), we find little evidence that selection on
unobservables can explain the results. Moreover, the di↵erential response by self-control dif-
fers only mildly by distance to the German border, suggesting that border-shopping does not
drive the e↵ect.
We provide evidence that habit formation shapes the di↵erential response by self-control.
Among panelists who report being addicted to sugar or fat, there is a stronger di↵erential
response by self-control to the tax hike but not to the tax repeal. This suggests that, for
habituated consumers, it requires self-control to reduce consumption but not to increase
consumption. Thus, habit formation can explain the asymmetry in responses to increasing
and decreasing prices: If consumers with low self-control are more habituated than those with
high self-control, they are less likely to incur the withdrawal costs associated with quitting the
consumption of a habituating sin good. In contrast, increasing consumption is not associated
with withdrawal costs, such that a di↵erential response to tax cuts is not expected. Ultimately,
we show theoretically that such an asymmetry prevails even when the initial habit stock and
self-control are independent.
Our study is motivated by the theoretical literature on taxation of behavioral internalities
like imperfect self-control. The idea is that a lack of self-control can lead consumers to over-
consume goods with long-run costs that are not fully taken into account at the moment of
consumption. A sin tax increases the instantaneous and future costs of consumption and
reduces over-consumption. Gruber and Köszegi (2001) show that optimal taxes on cigarettes
are substantially higher if individuals are addicted due to present-bias. O’Donoghue and
Rabin (2006) and Haavio and Kotakorpi (2011) argue that an internality correcting tax can
be welfare improving if individuals with low self-control are at least as responsive to a sin tax as
those with high self-control. Further, the comprehensive model of Allcott et al. (2019), which
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studies the welfare e↵ects and the distributional implications of sin taxes, takes the correction
of internalities into account. However, these papers do not make predictions regarding whether
consumers with low self-control actually respond to sin taxes, thus leaving this question to
empirical research.
We contribute to the burgeoning empirical literature that assesses targeting properties
of sin taxes by estimating heterogeneous tax responsiveness by self-control. Allcott et al.
(2019) estimate, in their empirical section, the share of soda consumption that is due to a
self-reported lack of self-control.2 They find that bias-induced consumption is decreasing in
income, which means that poor consumers can benefit more from the corrective e↵ects of the
tax. However, due to their focus on the regressivity of sin taxes, they do not consider if the
price elasticity varies with the level of self-control. In contrast, we use actual tax variation
and investigate if the tax actually targets consumers with low self-control. The targeting
properties of a soft drink tax are also investigated by Dubois et al. (2019) in a structural
demand model. They estimate price elasticities of di↵erent consumer groups and hypothesize
that the high soda preference of certain groups (e.g. young people and high sugar consumers)
is more likely due to biases. They find that young people are more price responsive, but that
high sugar consumers are less price responsive than the average consumer. We complement
these findings by employing an established measure of self-control and by exploiting exogenous
variation in prices to explicitly test the impact of self-control on price responsiveness.
Furthermore, we contribute to the empirical literature that uses quasi-experimental vari-
ation in sin taxes to estimate the impact of taxes on purchases. We are the first to use tax
variation to study heterogenous responses by self-control. There is a longstanding literature
that uses tax variation in tobacco and alcohol taxes to estimate price elasticities (see the
surveys in Chaloupka et al. (2012) for tobacco and in Wagenaar et al. (2009) for alcohol).
With the increasing prevalence of sin taxes on food, there are also more and more evaluations
of these kind of policies. Jensen and Smed (2013) and Smed et al. (2016) analyze the e↵ects
of the fat tax in Denmark in a pre-post design and document a significant drop in average
purchases of saturated fat from, for example, butter and margarine. Cawley et al. (2019b)
survey the empirical literature on soft drink taxes and conclude that average purchases de-
crease after tax introductions. This is documented for US cities like Berkeley and Philadelphia
using geographical control groups (e.g. Cawley et al., 2019a; Rojas and Wang, 2017) and for
the tax in Mexico using pre-post designs (Colchero et al., 2016, 2017).3 In earlier work, we
analyze the tax pass-through and average purchase response to the increase 2012 and repeal
2014 of the Danish tax on soft drinks using a pre-post design (Schmacker and Smed, 2020).
2They use the Nielsen household panel and classify panelists as low self-control if they respond “Definitely”
to the statement “I drink soda pop or other sugar-sweetened beverages more often than I should.”
3Although a reduction in purchases is not necessarily equivalent with a reduction in (sugar) consumption.
Seiler et al. (2019) show that many consumers avoid the tax in Philadelphia by shopping in neighboring
jurisdictions and Aguilar et al. (2019) show that the reduction of calories from soft drinks due to the Mexican
tax is o↵set by an increase of calories from untaxed sugary products.
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Where the focus in almost all of these papers is on the average change in purchases, in this
paper we use the exogenous variation in prices to test if di↵erent levels of self-control imply
di↵erent degrees of price responsiveness.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on habit formation and responsiveness to taxes by
providing empirical and theoretical evidence that tax hikes and cuts can have di↵erent e↵ects.
The seminal paper by Becker and Murphy (1988) already argues that a permanent change in
prices of a habit-forming good may have an initially small e↵ect on consumption that grows
over time until a new steady state is reached. Zhen et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence
for habit formation in demand for sugar sweetened beverages using a demand system model.
Colchero et al. (2017) evaluate the long-run response to the sugar sweetened beverage tax in
Mexico and find that the long-run response is, in fact, stronger than the short-run response.
We add a new perspective to this literature and show, both empirically and theoretically,
that tax increases have a smaller e↵ect on purchases of habit-forming goods for people with
low self-control. However, this e↵ect appears not to be symmetric for tax increases and tax
cuts, suggesting that consumers with low self-control find it hard to reduce consumption when
prices go up but react to price incentives when prices go down.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the conceptual
framework that motivates our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the institutional setting
and the dataset that we are using. Section 4 specifies the empirical strategy. Section 5
presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we briefly summarize a key result of the sin tax literature that motivates our
empirical investigation of heterogenous responses to sin taxes by self-control. O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2006) and Haavio and Kotakorpi (2011) show that, in a simple two-good model,
the optimal internality-correcting tax depends both on the average internality and on the
covariance of the price responsiveness and the internality: The optimal tax is higher if in-
dividuals with low self-control respond stronger to price changes than individuals with high
self-control and vice versa.4
More formally, models in the literature typically assume that preferences can be charac-
terized by a       model of self-control (Laibson, 1997). That means, individuals maximize
intertemporal utility:
4Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) and Haavio and Kotakorpi (2011), we do not consider external-
ities of consumption on others but only on the future self, so called internalities.
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Each period they receive instantaneous utility ut and future utility is discounted by time-
consistent discount factor   and a hyperbolic discount factor  . If   < 1 the agents have a
preference for immediate gratification (i.e. low self-control) and if   = 1 the agents behave
time-consistently.
In a two-good model, consumer i decides whether to consume a sin good xi that provides
instantaneous utility v(xit), but is associated with long-run costs c(xi,t 1), and a numeraire
good. Since consumers with low self-control (  < 1) underweight the future costs of consump-
tion, they overconsume the sin good. A social planner maximizing the long-run utility of all
individuals (i.e. setting   = 1 for everyone), may decide to impose a tax t on the sin good
to help consumers with low self-control to consume closer to their long-run utility. The idea
is that the tax serves consumers with low self-control as a commitment device by increasing
the instantaneous costs of consumption.







cov((1   )c0(x), @x@t )
@x̄/@t
.(2)
We provide the derivation of the optimal tax formula in Appendix A. The first term in
the optimal tax is the average internality in the population, i.e., the marginal costs that are
not accounted for due to a lack of self-control. This first term is corrected by the targeting
e ciency of the tax that is represented by the second term. The targeting of the tax is
described by the covariance between the internality due to a lack of self-control and the
responsiveness of consumption to tax changes (weighted by the average responsiveness of sin
good consumption to tax changes). Intuitively, the optimal tax is larger if those with the
largest internality reduce their consumption more than those without lack of self-control. In
that case, the tax is relatively e↵ective in correcting the internality. However, the tax is smaller
if consumers with low self-control respond less to the tax. In that case, the distortionary e↵ect
on consumers without self-control problem overweighs the internality-correcting e↵ect.
According to the existing literature, it is an empirical question whether the relationship
between self-control and price responsiveness is positive or negative (O’Donoghue and Rabin,
2006). Hence, this is what we aim to investigate empirically using the institutional setting
described in the next section.
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Notes: Graph shows soft drink and fat tax variation over time. The denoted taxes include 25% VAT.
3 Data
3.1 Institutional Background
For identification, we exploit variation in two di↵erent sin taxes: the soft drink tax and the
fat tax. Both were part of the Danish tax reform of 2010. The goal was to reduce income
taxes and instead increase taxes on consumption goods that have detrimental e↵ects on public
health or the environment (The Danish Ministry of Taxation, 2009). Besides the taxes on soft
drinks and fat, taxes on sweets, chocolate, ice cream, and tobacco were increased. Moreover,
a tax on the content of sugar in all goods was planned but never realized.
The tax variation is illustrated in Figure 1. The first tax that we study is the tax on sugary
soft drinks. It is a volumetric excise tax that is imposed on all soft drinks that contain more
than 0.5 grams of sugar per 100 milliliters. The soft drink tax in Denmark has a longstanding
tradition. Both its introduction and subsequent tax reforms were mainly motivated by the
goal of raising tax revenues (Bergman and Hansen, 2019). However, the increase of the tax
in January 2012 from 1.35 DKK to 1.98 DKK per liter (excise tax plus 25% value-added tax)
aimed to improve public health. This is also illustrated by the fact that the tax on diet soft
drinks remained constant at a lower level. In previous work, we estimate the pass-through of
the tax using a regression discontinuity approach and document a price increase of 1.17 DKK
(12.5 percent) in reaction to the tax hike (see Figure C.1 in the Appendix) (Schmacker and
Smed, 2020). Hence, the tax hike is substantially overshifted, which is consistent with the
7
study of Bergman and Hansen (2019) for earlier soft drink tax increases. In April 2013, the
Danish government announced it would repeal the tax on soft drinks in order to secure jobs
in the retail sector in the Danish-German border region and to make up for tax revenue losses
due to cross border trade. The tax was first decreased to 1.03 DKK (incl. VAT) in July 2013
and completely eliminated in January 2014. In Schmacker and Smed (2020), we estimate a
price drop of 2.29 DKK (23.4 percent) in response to the tax repeal, i.e. a bit more than full
pass-through (see Figure C.1 in the Appendix).
The second tax variation is the October 2011 introduction and January 2013 repeal of
the fat tax. The fat tax was applied to all products that contain more than 2.3g saturated
fats per 100g. It amounts to 1.60 DKK per 100g saturated fat plus 25% VAT, i.e. 2.00
DKK per 100g of saturated fats. Vallg̊arda et al. (2015) analyze the political debate around
the introduction and repeal of the fat tax. They conclude that a change in the framing
from public health arguments to economic arguments (cross-border shopping, administrative
burden, and regressive e↵ects on the poor) led from the introduction to the repeal. Since
the tax was proportional to the amount of saturated fat, the tax a↵ects product groups very
di↵erently. In the analysis, we consider butter since it contains a high amount of saturated
fats (approximately 50 percent) and has, therefore, experienced substantial tax variation. In
Appendix D.1, we show that the tax introduction is associated with an almost symmetric
increase in butter prices by 0.76 DKK per 100g and the repeal with a decrease by 0.61 DKK
per 100g.
3.2 Dataset
To investigate the response in purchases due to the tax variation, we use household panel
data from GfK Consumertracking Scandinavia for the years 2009 to 2014. Panelists are asked
to track all their food purchases on a weekly basis. GfK aims for a representative panel with
respect to geography, age, education, and family size. Panelists report quantities and prices
paid for grocery purchases that they bring into the home. Moreover, once a year, households
fill in a questionnaire on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. In 2013 and 2015, an
additional survey containing a broad range of questions about self-control and dietary habits
was sent to panelists. The responses to this questionnaire are matched with the purchase
records using the panel identifier.
In the analysis, we only include those households that report at least one purchase of the
product in question per year and have responded to the self-control questionnaire. These
restrictions leave us with 1,278 panelists for the soft drink tax estimations and 1,324 for the
fat tax estimations.
When looking at quantity purchased, we aggregate the purchases to monthly observations
to account for potential stockpiling. Hence, in the soft drink estimations, the dependent
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variable is monthly purchases of taxed soft drinks in centiliter (including colas, lemonades,
ice tea, and juices with added sugar). In the fat tax estimations, the dependent variable
is monthly purchases of butter in grams. We assign months a zero, in which purchases are
observed but none of these purchases belongs to the product category in question (soft drinks
or butter). If no grocery purchase is observed in a given month, it is considered a missing
observation for that month.
3.3 Measuring self-control
Self-control is measured using the scale developed by Tangney et al. (2004), which consists
of 36 statements concerning di↵erent domains of self-control (see the items in Table B.1).
The respondents indicate their approval to each of these statements on a 5-point Likert-scale.
Whenever possible, we use the 2013 data and, if the panelist did not fill in the survey in
2013, we impute the missing data with data from 2015. Hence, we assume that self-control
is a time-constant trait, which is supported by a high retest-reliability: among the 1,234
panelists, who have answered the self-control scale in both years, the scores from 2013 and
2015 correlate with r=0.783.
In order to reduce the large number of items and to find the latent dimension of self-
control that matters for food choices, we perform a principal component factor analysis using
all 2,387 panelists who filled in the self-control scale. As suggested in the original study
by Tangney et al. (2004), we decide to extract five factors. The resulting factor structure
is described in Appendix B. Based on the factor loadings and the responses given by the
panelists, we compute new variables that measures the level of self-control according to the
respective factor. We perform a median split to separate the sample in panelists with high
and low self-control. Thereby, we can analyze the association between self-control and the
variables of interest without making parametric assumptions about the relationship.
In the analysis, we use the second self-control factor, which can be described as temptation
tolerance and is associated with health-related habits. In Table B.2, we see panelists who are
in the bottom half of self-control according to this factor have higher body mass index (BMI)
and are more likely to be obese. They are more likely to respond that they would like to
reduce their weight. Moreover, they agree more often that they should eat less sugar and
animal fat. All of these correlations are substantially weaker or non-existent for the other
four self-control factors. Taken together, panelists with low self-control are more prone to
risky health behavior and are aware of it, but apparently a lack of self-control prevents them
from changing their eating habits.
Table B.1 shows the factor loadings of the self-control factors. It can be seen that the
selected second self-control factor loads high on the item “I eat healthy foods.” To make
sure that the inclusion of this item does not drive the results, we re-run the factor analysis
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Low High Unrestricted
Overall self-control self-control sample
Equivalized household income in DKK
<175K 18.7 17.7 19.6 19.3
175K-250K 26.1 28.0 24.4 26.0
250K-325K 18.2 17.5 18.9 17.8
325K-400K 19.6 20.1 19.1 19.5
 400K 17.4 16.7 18.1 17.4
Age group
<40 13.0 12.3 13.6 13.7
40-59 48.7 47.4 49.9 47.9
 60 38.4 40.3 36.5 38.4
Labour market status
Full time 38.7 42.3 35.3 38.5
Part time 27.2 24.4 29.9 27.7
Not employed 34.1 33.3 34.8 33.9
Education
No tertiary education 59.4 62.8 56.3 59.4
1-3 years tertiary educ. 15.0 14.3 15.6 14.8
> 3 years tertiary educ. 25.6 22.9 28.1 25.8
Household size 1.921 1.941 1.901 1.909
(0.985) (1.041) (0.928) (0.988)
Number of child. age 0-6 0.066 0.090 0.044 0.068
(0.321) (0.381) (0.249) (0.326)
Number of child. age 7-14 0.130 0.147 0.113 0.128
(0.458) (0.501) (0.413) (0.454)
Number of child. age 15-20 0.100 0.101 0.099 0.099
(0.367) (0.365) (0.370) (0.365)
Households 1,278 623 655 1,412
Observations (Household-months) 78,137 37,981 40,156 85,400
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics of the GfK Consumertracking Scandinavia data used in the soft drink
tax analysis. Displayed are relative frequencies of values of categorical variables, as well as means and standard
deviations (in parentheses) of continuous variables. Household income is equivalized using the OECD scale,
i.e. dividing household income by the square root of the household size.
excluding this item. Table B.3 shows that the resulting factor loadings are very similar,
suggesting that the results are not driven by the respective item. In Section B.1, we conduct
robustness checks using this alternative measure of self-control and find very similar results.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1, we show descriptive statistics of the overall sample used in the analysis, as well
as descriptives of the sample split by self-control. Moreover, in the last column, we show
descriptives for the unrestricted sample, which also includes panelists who report at least one
purchase in every sample year but for whom we have no information on self-control.
The demographic characteristics appear quite similar across the di↵erent sample restric-
tions. However, there is an intuitive association between self-control and education, with high
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self-control respondents having higher education. In the robustness section, we address if the
di↵erential response by self-control is a↵ected if we also control for heterogenous responses
by education.
4 Empirical strategy
In order to test if the demand response to tax changes di↵ers by self-control, we estimate the
within-household variation in soft drink purchases the year before and after the tax changes.
Due to our bandwidth of one year, we can keep seasonal variation before and after the tax
constant and also can capture changes that occur with a lag due to habit formation.
The empirical model for estimating purchase quantity in month t by consumer i is
quantityit = X
0
it↵ =↵0 + ↵1taxt + ↵2(taxt ⇥ ( i =  high)) +  i + ⌘t + ↵4Zit + ✏it(3)
where the dependent variable is either the observed quantity, the purchase incidence in a
given month (extensive margin), or the log-transformed quantity given a purchase (intensive
margin). The variable taxt is a dummy variable that is one after the tax change and zero
before. We interact the tax dummy with indicator functions that specify if consumer i is
characterized by low or high levels of self-control as defined in the previous section. Hence,
↵2 estimates the di↵erential e↵ect of the tax change on purchase quantity for consumers with
high self-control compared to those with low self-control.  i denotes household fixed-e↵ects,
which are included to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and ⌘t denote
quarter fixed e↵ects. Zit is a set of household-specific controls that includes the number of
kids in age groups 0-6, 7-14, and 15-20, the household size, income group, and labor market
status of the main shopper.5 In the analysis of the soft-drink tax, Zit also includes the average
monthly temperature in Denmark.
The main coe cient of interest is the interaction e↵ect of the tax dummy and the self-
control indicator, ↵2. In order to identify if the di↵erential responsiveness is due to self-
control, we must make the following assumptions. First, we assume that consumers with low
and high self-control exhibit parallel trends in consumption. We demonstrate the credibility
of this assumptions and show that trends are parallel in the years absent the tax reforms.
Second, we assume that di↵erences in price responsiveness are due to self-control and not
due to other correlated characteristics, like income and education. Therefore, we investigate
if the di↵erential response by self-control remains stable when additionally controlling for
di↵erential changes by income, education, nutritional knowledge, and tastes.
5We do not control for education since there is little within-household variation over time.
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As is often the case with household-level purchase data, the distribution of purchases is
characterized by a mass at zero and a right-skewed distribution. To prevent outliers from
having an undue influence on the parameter estimates (Manning and Mullahy, 2001), we
employ multiple measures. First, we winsorize the reported quantities at the 99 percent
level, i.e., the largest 1 percent of reported quantities are set to the quantity at the 99th
percentile. Second, we use a two-part model that estimates, first, the likelihood to consume
any soft-drinks (extensive margin) and, second, the amount of soft-drinks provided that a
positive quantity is observed (intensive margin) (Mullahy, 1998). Consequently, the expected
value of the quantity is the product of the predicted purchase probability (X 0it↵
ext.) and the
conditional (and re-transformed) purchase quantity (exp(X 0it↵
int.)):
E(quantityit|Xit) = (X 0it↵ext.) · exp(X 0it↵int.) ·D(4)
where D = 1/N
P
exp(ln(qit)   X 0it ) is the Duan smearing factor that is needed for
retransformation since E(exp(✏it)) is not zero (Duan, 1983). We compute the predicted
purchase quantity separately for consumers with low and high self-control.
For each tax event, we consider one year before the tax change and one year after the tax
change. For the soft drink tax estimations, we omit the months January and December of
each year. Otherwise, we might overestimate the e↵ect of the tax hike in January 2012 due
to customers stockpiling soft drinks in December 2011 and living o↵ stock in January 2012
(hence, we compare 2/2011-11/2011 to 2/2012-11/2012). In case of the soft drink tax repeal,
we compare the year before the first tax cut in July 2013 (10/2012-6/2013, without January
and December) to the year after the complete repeal in January 2014 (2/2014-11/2014).
For the fat tax, we compare the years before and after the introduction in October 2011
(10/2010-09/2011 versus 10/2011-09/2012) and before and after the repeal in January 2013
(01/2012-12/2012 versus 01/2013-12/2013).
5 Results
In the empirical analysis, we investigate the di↵erential responsiveness by self-control, first,
for soft drink tax changes and, second, for fat tax changes. In both cases, we provide graphical
evidence on the development of purchases surrounding the tax changes before we present the
regression results.
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Figure 2: Predicted values of monthly soft drink purchase quantity by self-control
Notes: Graph shows annual predicted values after controlling for household and quarter fixed e↵ects and
controls (household size, income, labor market status, number of kids, temperature), using GfK data. The
shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered on the household level. The
vertical lines indicate the timing of tax changes.
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Table 2: Soft drink purchases in response to soft drink tax changes by self-control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
Quantity Margin Margin Quantity Margin Margin
Panel A: Tax Hike
Tax Hike -7.128 -0.014 -0.029 -9.622 -0.017⇤ -0.036
(16.630) (0.010) (0.033) (16.738) (0.010) (0.035)
High self-control ⇥ Tax Hike -60.677⇤⇤⇤ -0.032⇤⇤ -0.063 -58.208⇤⇤⇤ -0.030⇤⇤ -0.059
(21.018) (0.013) (0.044) (21.051) (0.013) (0.044)
Households 1278 1278 1158 1278 1278 1158
Household Months 22197 22197 9667 22197 22197 9667
Panel B: Tax Repeal
Tax Repeal 81.143⇤⇤⇤ 0.041⇤⇤⇤ 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 92.683⇤⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.131⇤⇤⇤
(17.602) (0.010) (0.031) (18.660) (0.011) (0.034)
High self-control ⇥ Tax Cut -5.710 0.001 0.019 -2.741 0.002 0.026
(24.001) (0.014) (0.045) (23.920) (0.014) (0.044)
Households 1278 1278 1164 1278 1278 1164
Household Months 22747 22747 9919 22747 22747 9919
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK data.
In columns (1) and (4) the dependent variable is monthly quantity in centiliter. In columns (2) and (5) it is
purchase incidence in a given month. In columns (3) and (6) it is log-transformed quantity. Controls include
household size, income, labor market status, number of kids, temperature, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤
p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
5.1 Soft Drink Tax Variation
Figure 2 shows predicted values after controlling for household fixed e↵ects and the control
variables specified in Section 4.6 First, the purchases of consumers with low and high self-
control appear to follow parallel trends in the years before the first tax change, thus lending
support to our identification strategy. When the tax increased in 2012, soft drink purchases
by consumers with low self-control did not change significantly, while we observe a significant
drop for consumers with high self-control. The tax was cut in half in July 2013, then com-
pletely repealed in January 2014. In response, we observe a marked increase in purchases by
both consumer groups.
In order to quantify the purchase response to the tax variation, we show estimation results
of the empirical model in Table 2 for the two parameters of interest (↵1 and ↵2). The
coe cient ↵1 is the tax indicator variable, which gives the change in purchases by low self-
control consumers (the reference category), and ↵2 is the interaction of the tax dummy with
the high self-control indicator, which gives the di↵erential change in purchases by high self-
6Figure C.2 shows the figure without controlling for household and quarter fixed e↵ects and without
demographic controls.
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Table 3: Change in soft-drink purchases based on predicted values from two-part model
Low self-control High self-control
Panel A: Tax Hike
Relative change -0.073⇤ -0.211⇤⇤⇤
(0.039)b (0.030)b
Absolute change -18.446 -52.394⇤⇤⇤
(21.694)b (16.647)b
Panel B: Tax Repeal
Relative change 0.263⇤⇤⇤ 0.283⇤⇤⇤
(0.042)b (0.045)b
Absolute change 56.614⇤⇤⇤ 60.628⇤⇤⇤
(21.323)b ( 22.463 )b
Notes: Table shows predicted values from the two-part model as described in Section 4, using GfK data. The
predicted values are based on the extensive and intensive margin shown in Table 2. For the absolute change,
the unit of measurement is in monthly centiliter. b Standard errors are bootstrapped with 2,000 replications
and clustered on the household level. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
control consumers. Panel A shows results for the tax hike and Panel B for the tax repeal. In
the first column, we use the absolute quantity as dependent variable, in the second column the
purchase incidence (extensive margin), and in the third column the log-transformed quantity
given a purchase (intensive margin). In the fourth to sixth column, we add time-varying
controls.
The results in Panel A reveal that consumers with high self-control decreased their pur-
chases significantly more than consumers with low self-control in response to the tax hike.
Consumers with low self-control have not reduced their purchases significantly as the coe -
cient of the tax hike dummy tells us. While consumers with high self-control responded more
strongly to the tax hike both in terms of purchase probability (extensive margin) and pur-
chase quantity (intensive margin), the di↵erential response is only significant on the extensive
margin. In Table 3, we use the estimates from the extensive and intensive margin to calculate
predicted values of a two-part model, as described in Equation (4). The results corroborates
the findings from the OLS using the untransformed quantity. Consumers with low self-control
reduced their purchases by only 7.3 percent. In contrast, the purchases by consumers with
high self-control dropped by 21.1 percent. The response is larger both in relative and absolute
terms.
In Panel B of Table 2, we conduct the same exercise for the tax repeal. Here, we compare
purchases one year after the tax repeal to one year before the first tax cut. The tax repeal
dummy shows that consumers with low self-control have increased their purchases of soft-
drinks in absolute terms, both on the extensive and intensive margins. Again, the results
are not strongly a↵ected by adding time-variant control variables. However, this time we do
not observe a di↵erential response by high self-control consumers. In Panel B of Table 3, the
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predicted values from the two-part model emphasize that the absolute and relative increases in
purchases are, in fact, very similar across the consumer groups: While purchases by consumers
with low self-control grow by 26.3 percent, consumers with high self-control increase purchases
by 28.3 percent.
Our analysis assumes that, absent the tax changes, consumers with low and high levels
of self-control would have exhibited the same trends. While we cannot directly test this as-
sumption, we provide credibility for it by running the same estimation for placebo tax changes
preceding the actual tax changes. In Table C.1, we complete this exercise for placebo tax
changes on January 1, 2010, and January 1, 2011. We observe no di↵erential change in pur-
chases by high self-control consumers, thus lending support to the parallel trend assumption.
Robustness
We provide further robustness checks in the Appendix. In Figure C.4, we show results from
a permutation test with 10,000 iterations, in which we randomly reshu✏e if consumers are
classified as high or low self-control. For the tax hike, only 0.2 percent of coe cients are
more negative than the actually estimated interaction coe cient, which corroborates its sig-
nificance. For the tax repeal, 45.6 percent of randomly reshu✏ed iterations produce a more
negative e↵ect, suggesting that there is no significant di↵erence for the tax cut. While we
cluster the standard errors on the consumer level in the main specification, in Table C.2, we
follow the suggestion of Bertrand et al. (2004) and collapse the months into one pre- and one
post-tax change period. The results show that the standard errors are very similar compared
to the main specification.
As further robustness tests, we re-estimate our main specification on the subsample of
single households. The reason is that there is likely heterogeneity in soft drink preferences
within households and the main shopper (whose self-control we elicit) may not be the person
demanding to buy the soft-drinks. By restricting to single households, we can be sure that
measured self-control coincides with the self-control of the individual who actually buys and
consumes the soft drinks. Table C.3 presents the results, which reiterate the previous findings:
High self-control individuals reduce their purchases significantly more than low self-control
consumers when the tax goes up, and the interaction coe cient is even larger than in the full
sample. However, there is no di↵erential change that is significantly di↵erent from zero when
taxes go down.
Moreover, in Table C.4, we re-run the estimations using a continuous measure of self-
control instead of a median sample split. Hence, we make a more restrictive parametric
assumption concerning the influence of self-control. For the tax hike, we observe that the
higher the level of self-control, the stronger is the reduction in purchases. For the tax repeal,
there is not a significant di↵erence between the groups. In Table B.4, we use the alternative
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measure of self-control that excludes the revealed preference item about healthy food con-
sumption contained in the original scale (cf. Section 3.3). The first column shows that the
results are similar to the main specification.
Ultimately, in Figure C.3, we replicate Figure C.2 for the dataset of beverages that are
not a↵ected by the tax on sugary soft drinks (including milk, water, fruit juices, diet soft
drinks). We observe that there is a similar increase in purchases by both consumers with high
and low self-control after the tax hike. The figure suggests that the di↵erential response in
purchases of taxed beverages is not due to di↵erential changes in reporting behavior.
5.2 Fat Tax Variation
In the previous section, we show that consumers with low self-control respond less to increasing
soft drink taxes than consumers with high self-control. In contrast, when soft drink taxes are
cut, there is not a systematically di↵erent response. In this section, we check whether this
pattern is particular to soft drink tax changes or whether it also emerges for the introduction
and repeal of the fat tax.
In the following, we look at butter as it is one of the goods that contains the most saturated
fat and is frequently purchased. The analysis of the fat tax complements the soft drink tax
analysis in several dimensions. First, unlike the soft drink tax, the magnitude of the fat tax
variation is very similar for tax hikes and cuts (see Appendix D.1). Hence, we can exclude
that a di↵erence in responsiveness is due to low and high self-control consumers responding
di↵erently to larger and smaller tax variation. Second, by looking at butter, we can exclude
that the di↵erential responsiveness is explained by low and high self-control consumers having
di↵erent preferences for sugar.
We run the same estimations as described in Section 4 on the data for butter.7 Figure 3
shows predicted values for butter purchases over time.8 Since the tax was in place from
the beginning of the fourth quarter 2011 (starting October 2011) until the end of the fourth
quarter 2012 (ending December 2012), we must exclude one of the taxed quarters to compare
entire years.9 We observe that in the pre-tax years, consumers with low self-control purchase
more butter than those with high self-control. When the tax is introduced, we find, once
again, that consumers with high self-control reduce their purchases significantly more than
7The estimations mirror the estimations for soft drinks. The only notable di↵erences are, first, that we
restrict the sample to households who report a butter purchase in the years 2010 through 2013. Second, we
do not include the average temperature as a control variable since temperature is arguably less relevant for
butter demand than it is for soft drink demand.
8Figure D.2 shows the figure without controlling for household and quarter fixed e↵ects as well as demo-
graphic controls.
9In Figure 3, we exclude the fourth quarter of every year. In Figure D.3 we compare entire years but
exclude the fourth quarter in 2012 to make the years comparable. However, the pattern that emerges is very
similar.
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Figure 3: Predicted values of monthly butter purchase quantity by self-control
Notes: Graph shows predicted values after controlling for household and quarter fixed e↵ects and controls
(household size, income, labor market status, number of kids), using GfK data. The shaded areas represent
95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered on the household level. The vertical lines indicate the
timing of tax changes.
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Table 4: Butter purchases in response to fat tax by self-control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
Quantity Margin Margin Quantity Margin Margin
Panel A: Tax Introduction
Tax Introduction -25.141⇤⇤ -0.011 -0.040⇤⇤⇤ -21.930⇤⇤ -0.010 -0.037⇤⇤⇤
(10.373) (0.008) (0.013) (10.438) (0.008) (0.013)
High self-control ⇥ Tax -30.118⇤⇤ -0.019⇤ -0.005 -30.972⇤⇤ -0.020⇤ -0.005
(14.276) (0.011) (0.018) (14.274) (0.011) (0.018)
Households 1324 1324 1297 1324 1324 1297
Household Months 28162 28162 18026 28162 28162 18026
Panel B: Tax Repeal
Tax Repeal 22.452⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤ 0.028⇤⇤ 26.766⇤⇤ 0.016⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤
(10.069) (0.007) (0.013) (11.361) (0.008) (0.015)
High self-control ⇥ No Tax -11.606 0.003 -0.023 -11.036 0.003 -0.020
(13.810) (0.010) (0.018) (13.894) (0.010) (0.018)
Households 1323 1323 1302 1323 1323 1302
Household Months 28829 28829 18782 28829 28829 18782
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK data.
In columns (1) and (4) the dependent variable is monthly quantity in grams. In columns (2) and (5) it is
purchase incidence in a given month. In columns (3) and (6) it is log-transformed quantity. Controls include
household size, income, labor market status, number of kids, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.01
those with low self-control. Furthermore, when the tax is repealed, both consumer groups
respond to a similar extent.
We show estimation results of the coe cients of interest from the empirical model in
Table 4. Panel A illustrates that, in response to the fat tax introduction, consumers with high
self-control reduce their purchases significantly more than consumers with low self-control.
As seen in columns (2) and (4), the di↵erence is mainly driven by a response on the extensive
margin. The predicted values from the two-part model in Panel A in Table 5 illustrate that
both in relative and absolute terms, the purchase response by high self-control consumers
is stronger. While consumers with low self-control reduce their purchases by 5.6 percent,
purchases by high self-control consumers drop by 8.8 percent.
In Panel B of Table 4, we run the estimation for the tax repeal. As before, we find little
evidence for a di↵erential response to the tax repeal. If anything, consumers with low self-
control increase their purchases more than those with high self-control, but the di↵erential
response is not significant. In the two-part model in Panel B of Table 5 we observe that
consumers with low self-control increase their purchases by 5.7 percent and those with low
self-control by 3.5 percent.
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Table 5: Change in butter purchases based on predicted values from two-part model by
self-control
Low self-control High self-control
Panel A: Tax Hike
Relative change -0.056⇤⇤⇤ -0.088⇤⇤⇤
(0.012)b (0.012)b
Absolute change -30.827⇤⇤ -48.621⇤⇤⇤
(9.933)b (10.235)b
Panel B: Tax Repeal
Relative change 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.035⇤⇤⇤
(0.012)b (0.013)b
Absolute change 29.631⇤⇤ 18.001⇤
(9.776)b (10.384)b
Notes: Table shows predicted values from the two-part model as described in Section 4, using GfK data. The
predicted values are based on the extensive and intensive margin shown in Table 4. For the absolute change,
the unit of measurement is in monthly grams. b Standard errors are bootstrapped with 2,000 replications and
clustered on the household level. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
In Table D.2, the results of placebo tax changes in January 2010 and October 2010 are
shown. Most importantly, the interaction coe cients, which measure di↵erential changes in
response to the placebo tax changes, are insignificant and close to zero. Both groups increase
their purchases from 2009 to 2010, but the trend does not di↵er between consumer groups,
as shown in Figure 3.
In sum, we find evidence supporting the findings of the soft drink tax analysis. In response
to the fat tax, consumers with low self-control respond less to increasing prices. While the
general pattern persists, the results appear slightly noisier than in the case of soft drinks. This
could be explained by stronger controversies about the adverse health e↵ects of saturated fat
(see the summary of the Danish public discourse in Vallg̊arda et al. (2015)).
Robustness
In Appendix D.2, we conduct further robustness checks for the fat tax variation. Figure D.4
shows coe cients from a permutation test with 10,000 iterations. While for the tax introduc-
tions only 1.34 percent of estimates are more negative than the actual interaction coe cient,
this is true for 20.5 percent of coe cients for the tax repeal. Hence, while the di↵erential
response for the tax introduction is unlikely to be purely random, this cannot be rejected for
the tax repeal. In Table D.3, we collapse the pre- and post-tax month and find the standard
errors to be very similar to those for the main specification.
In Table D.4, we assess the sensitivity to the sample split in the main specification. Instead
of a median split, we split the sample into three quantiles and observe that consumers with
the lowest level of self-control respond the least to the tax hike. However, the di↵erence is
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only significant on the extensive margin. After the tax repeal, we again do not observe a
systematic di↵erential response by self-control. In Table B.5, we use the alternative measure
of self-control described in Section 3.3. The results for the main specification in the first
column are similar to those obtained for the original self-control scale.
5.3 Alternative explanations
In the following, we investigate other potential explanations for the di↵erential response by
self-control. Therefore, we interact the tax indicator with other observable characteristics,
such as income, education, tastes for unhealthy foods, and nutritional knowledge. Moreover,
we employ a bounding approach to assess the importance of selection on unobservables and we
show that cross-border shopping is unlikely to explain the di↵erential response by self-control.
5.3.1 Education and nutritional knowledge
First, we address the concern that self-control is correlated with education and that education
is responsible for the di↵erential response. In the second column of Table 6, we interact the
soft drink tax dummy additionally with an indicator for high education. High education
means that the panelist has attended at least one year of tertiary education whereas the
reference category is no tertiary education. The interaction coe cients of self-control and
the tax change indicators are almost una↵ected compared to the main specification. In the
second column of Table 7, we conduct the same exercise for the fat tax. Also here, including
education does not change the interaction coe cient of self-control and tax indicators.
Second, it is conceivable that our measure of self-control is associated with knowledge
about the healthiness of food and that this drives the di↵erential response. To account for
that we add the interaction of the tax change dummy with an indicator if consumers approve
to the statement “I believe I would make healthier food choices if I had more information on
how to eat healthy.” In the third column of Table 6, we show the results for the soft drink tax
variation. For both the tax hike and the tax repeal, the interaction with self-control remains
of similar magnitude. Further, in Table 7, we observe that a similar pattern is observed for
the fat tax variation.
5.3.2 Income
As self-control is positively correlated with income, it could be that tighter budget constraints
are the reason for the di↵erential response. However, if that was the case, we would expect
consumers with low self-control (and low income) to reduce purchases more than consumers
with high self-control (and high income). Hence, the finding that low self-control consumers
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Table 6: Soft-drink purchases in response to soft drink tax changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Tax hike
Tax hike -9.622 -9.545 -13.564 -3.699 -29.305 -24.885
(0.010) (20.331) (18.621) (20.410) (21.752) (27.407)
Tax hike
⇥ High self-control -58.208⇤⇤⇤ -58.196⇤⇤⇤ -55.619⇤⇤ -58.517⇤⇤⇤ -50.462⇤⇤ -50.919⇤⇤
(21.051) (20.934) (21.991) (20.991) (22.385) (22.550)
⇥ High education -0.203 10.239
(19.912) (20.995)
⇥ Lacks knowledge 14.034 4.929
(33.332) (34.235)
⇥ High income -12.441 -15.970
(22.616) (24.673)
⇥ Unhealthy taste 36.396 35.499
(22.851) (23.033)
Households 1278 1278 1278 1197 1197 1197
Household Months 22197 22197 22197 20887 20887 20887
Panel B: Tax repeal
Tax repeal 92.683⇤⇤⇤ 97.502⇤⇤⇤ 94.996⇤⇤⇤ 90.934⇤⇤⇤ 90.454⇤⇤⇤ 88.224⇤⇤⇤
(18.660) (22.335) (19.469) (22.437) (24.413) (27.908)
Tax repeal
⇥ High self-control -2.741 -1.911 -0.275 -3.474 1.643 1.208
(23.920) (23.764) (24.053) (23.768) (25.784) (25.122)
⇥ High education -12.691 -20.186
(23.494) (25.398)
⇥ Lacks knowledge -14.715 -14.804
(32.392) (33.780)
⇥ High income 3.404 21.066
(23.740) (25.896)
⇥ Unhealthy taste 2.737 5.541
(26.414) (27.429)
Households 1278 1278 1278 1197 1197 1197
Household Months 22747 22747 22747 21389 21389 21389
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK data.
The dependent variable is monthly quantity in centiliters. “High education” means tertiary education (ref.:
vocational education), “Lacks knowledge” identifies consumers who agree to the statement “I believe I would
make healthier food choices if I had more information on how to eat healthy”, “High income” are in the top half
of the distribution of equivalized incomes, “Unhealthy taste” indicates that consumers agree to the statement
“I believe I would make healthier food choices if unhealthy food was less tasty”. Controls include household
size, income, labor market status, number of kids, temperature, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.01
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Table 7: Butter purchases in response to fat tax changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Tax hike
Tax hike -21.930⇤⇤ -27.985⇤⇤ -19.347⇤ -21.642⇤ -11.523 -14.300
(10.438) (12.133) (11.550) (12.961) (13.049) (16.772)
Tax hike
⇥ High self-control -30.972⇤⇤ -31.941⇤⇤ -29.961⇤⇤ -30.941⇤⇤ -32.109⇤⇤ -34.573⇤⇤
(14.274) (14.253) (14.931) (14.276) (15.007) (15.163)
⇥ High education 15.882 17.203
(14.410) (15.265)
⇥ Lacks knowledge -27.041 -18.267
(22.717) (22.902)
⇥ High income -2.313 -3.596
(15.278) (16.191)
⇥ Unhealthy taste -26.769⇤ -24.621
(15.510) (15.419)
Households 1324 1324 1324 1241 1241 1241
Household Months 28162 28162 28162 26504 26504 26504
Panel B: Tax repeal
Tax repeal 26.766⇤⇤ 27.350⇤⇤ 30.607⇤⇤ 25.173⇤ 29.130⇤⇤ 33.098⇤
(11.361) (13.281) (12.212) (14.614) (13.802) (17.967)
Tax repeal
⇥ High self-control -11.036 -10.942 -13.215 -10.966 -12.393 -12.488
(13.894) (13.903) (14.296) (13.867) (14.210) (14.229)
⇥ High education -1.459 -9.337
(13.914) (14.611)
⇥ Lacks knowledge -11.992 -12.054
(19.979) (20.374)
⇥ High income 2.790 1.433
(15.759) (16.824)
⇥ Unhealthy taste -1.860 0.466
(14.375) (14.635)
Households 1323 1323 1323 1241 1241 1241
Household Months 28829 28829 28829 27144 27144 27144
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK
data. The dependent variable is monthly quantity in grams. “High education” means tertiary education (ref.:
vocational education), “Lacks knowledge” identifies consumers who agree to the statement “I believe I would
make healthier food choices if I had more information on how to eat healthy”, “High income” are in the top half
of the distribution of equivalized incomes, “Unhealthy taste” indicates that consumers agree to the statement
“I believe I would make healthier food choices if unhealthy food was less tasty”. Controls include household
size, income, labor market status, number of kids, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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respond less to the tax hike already suggests that budget constraints do not drive the di↵er-
ential response.
In the fourth column of Table 6, we re-run the main specification for the soft drink tax
variation but add an interaction with a dummy indicating whether a panelist is in the top half
of the distribution of equivalized incomes. We observe that the coe cients for the interaction
of soft drink tax hike and repeal with self-control are of a similar magnitude compared to our
main specification. In Table 7, we conduct the same exercise for the fat tax and observe that
the coe cients of interest also move very little when including interactions with income.
5.3.3 Tastes for unhealthy food
It is conceivable that measured self-control is correlated with tastes for unhealthy food. To
check if the di↵erential response by self-control can be attributed to di↵erences in taste,
we add the interaction with a dummy variable that indicates if consumers approve to the
statement “I believe I would make healthier food choices if unhealthy food was less tasty.”
In the fifth column of Table 6, we observe in Panel A that the interaction of the tax hike
with self-control becomes slightly smaller but remains sizeable and significant. Consumers
who like unhealthy food seem to be less likely to reduce their purchases in response to the
tax hike, but the interaction is only marginally significant. In Panel B, there is – as in the
main specification – not much evidence for a di↵erential e↵ect by self-control.
In Table 7, we add the interaction with a preference for unhealthy food to the fat tax es-
timation. We observe, in contrast to the case of soft drinks, that consumers with a preference
for unhealthy foods decrease their purchases more in reaction to the fat tax introduction.
Nevertheless, controlling for tastes leaves the di↵erential response by self-control almost un-
a↵ected. In Panel B, we observe that there is not a di↵erential response to the tax repeal by
taste di↵erences.
5.3.4 Selection on unobservables
While we cannot directly test for the influence of selection on unobservables, we can draw
some inferences based on the movement of coe cients and explained variance when controlling
for observables. We adapt the approach suggested by Oster (2019), which builds on Altonji
et al. (2019). The idea is to bound the estimates by making assumptions about the relative
importance of unobserved relative to observed variables and about the highest explainable
variance.
We aim to determine whether within-in household changes in purchases vary due to dif-
ferences in self-control or due to unobserved di↵erences between self-control groups. Hence,
the baseline estimate is a fixed-e↵ect regression of purchases on only a tax dummy and the
tax dummy interacted with the self-control indicator. In the controlled specification, we addi-
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tionally control for time-varying controls and interactions of the tax dummy with education,
nutritional knowledge, income, and unhealthy taste (i.e., the specification in the last columns
of Tables 6 and 7). We assume that selection on unobservables is as important as selection
on observables and that it can either go into the same or into the opposite direction. The
argument is that if controlling for informative observables does not change the coe cients
much, controlling for unobservables would not do so either. In Appendix E, we describe the
approach in detail.
Table E.1 presents the results of the bounding exercise. For the soft drink tax hike, we
obtain bounds of [ 67.639, 30.751]. Since the bounds do not contain zero, proportional
selection on unobservables is unlikely to explain the di↵erential e↵ect by self-control. In
contrast, for the tax repeal, the bounds are [ 6.324, 8.759], which corroborates the finding
that there is no di↵erential response by self-control for the tax repeal. When the fat tax is
introduced, the bounds are [ 48.212, 22.723], suggesting that the di↵erential response to
increasing taxes is not due to selection on unobservables. For the tax repeal, the bounds
are [ 12.581, 12.380], however, despite the tight bounds the coe cient is not significant as
discussed above. Taken together, the bounding results suggest that there is little evidence
that selection on unobservables drives the results.
5.3.5 Cross-border shopping
As mentioned above, the tax on soft drinks was principally repealed to reduce cross-border
shopping in Germany. In general, this should not be a concern for our analysis since in the
GfK Consumertracking data, consumers also report purchases abroad. However, one may be
concerned that cross-border purchases are underreported and consumers engage di↵erently
in border-shopping depending on self-control. To assess the importance of this channel, we
distinguish if consumers have access to the German border without using a toll bridge or
ferry.10 Thus, the “No Toll” indicator is a proxy for how easy and economic it is to buy
groceries in Germany.
Hence, in Table 8, we separately estimate the model on “Toll” and “No toll” households
to assess heterogenous e↵ects by distance to border. For the soft drink tax hike, we observe
in Panel A that among consumers in the “Toll” region (i.e. where the border is not easily
accessible) the di↵erence between low and high self-control is somewhat stronger compared
to consumers in the “No toll” region. However, even in the “No toll” region the interaction
is not substantially smaller compared to the main specification and remains significant at the
10 percent level despite the reduced sample size. This seems to suggest that consumers with
10While households in Jutland and Funen do not have to use a toll bridge or ferry to reach the German
border, households in Sealand, Copenhagen, and Bornholm must. The costs to use the ferry or bridge for a
standard car start at 30 Euros each way. In Schmacker and Smed (2020), we provide descriptive evidence that
this distinction is informative about the propensity to engage in cross-border shopping.
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Table 8: Soft drink and butter purchases by access to German border
Soft drink tax Fat tax
No toll Toll No toll Toll
Panel A: Tax Introduction
Tax Introduction -7.015 -13.939 -24.632⇤ -17.519
(20.447) (27.353) (14.850) (14.162)
High self-control ⇥ Tax -47.445⇤ -73.316⇤⇤ -30.953 -32.436
(27.174) (31.834) (19.379) (20.860)
Households 730 547 755 569
n 12752 9425 16064 12098
Panel B: Tax Repeal
Tax Repeal 76.889⇤⇤⇤ 111.706⇤⇤⇤ 26.244⇤ 27.505⇤
(22.522) (31.743) (15.534) (16.340)
High self-control ⇥ No Tax -0.811 -7.519 -14.567 -6.041
(31.099) (37.770) (19.234) (19.661)
Households 734 544 756 565
n 13043 9704 16419 12391
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK data.
The estimations are performed separately on the sample of “toll” and “no toll” households. “Toll” indicates
that a consumer has to use a toll bridge or ferry to reach the cross-border shops in Germany. Controls include
household size, income, labor market status, number of kids, temperature, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤
p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Correlations of self-control with habit and addiction
(1) (2) (3)
“I am addicted “I am addicted “Hard to establish
to sugar” to fat” healthy eating habits”
Low self-control 0.098⇤⇤⇤ 0.066⇤⇤⇤ 0.177⇤⇤⇤
(0.026) (0.020) (0.026)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.297 0.131 0.287
Households 1197 1197 1197
Notes: The dependent variable in each column is a dummy indicating whether panelists in the GfK Consumer-
Tracking panel answer “Somewhat agree” or “Totally agree” to the respective statement. The regressions
control for income, age, education, labor market status, and number of children. The complete statement in
Column (3) is “I find it harder to establish healthy eating habits than to establish unhealthy eating habits”.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
high self-control do not reduce their purchases as much when there are close-by opportunities
to avoid the tax. In Panel B, we see that purchases increased more in the “Toll” region after
the tax repeal but there is again not much evidence for a di↵erential response by self-control.
Cross-border shopping is arguably less important for butter purchases since butter is not
as storable as soft drinks. In line with this argument, we observe that the interaction of self-
control and the fat tax dummy is similar in magnitude for “Toll” and “No toll” consumers.
The magnitude of the interaction coe cient in Panel A is almost the same compared to the
main specification, but does not have the statistical power to reach significance due to the
reduced sample size.
5.4 Proposed mechanism: Habit formation
Ultimately, we argue that habit formation is the most likely mechanism to explain the asym-
metric pattern to tax increases and cuts. First, we show that theoretical models of self-control
and habit formation predict the observed empirical pattern. Second, we provide empirical
evidence supporting that habit formation shapes the di↵erential response by self-control.
In the empirical analysis, we document an asymmetry in responses to tax increases and
decreases depending on self-control. This asymmetry is hard to reconcile with a standard
model of time-separable utility since price elasticities are typically symmetric to prices going
up or down. Hence, if consumers with low self-control respond less to increasing taxes,
they should also respond less to decreasing taxes. However, when there are intertemporal
complementarities in consumption due to habit formation or addiction (Becker and Murphy,
1988), this is not necessarily the case.
Habit formation or addiction can, for example, be modelled in the form of withdrawal
costs that must be incurred if an individual stops consuming a habituating good that she
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Table 10: Soft drink and butter purchases by reportedly addicted to sugar/fat
Soft drink tax Fat tax
“Not addicted “Addicted “Not addicted “Addicted
to sugar” to sugar” to fat” to fat”
Panel A: Tax Introduction
Tax Introduction -42.387⇤ 45.848⇤ -31.283⇤⇤⇤ 8.647
(21.614) (27.112) (11.333) (31.355)
High self-control ⇥ Tax -37.453 -75.525⇤ -17.392 -97.823⇤⇤
(25.538) (39.488) (15.435) (45.652)
Households 842 355 1077 164
n 14838 6049 23045 3459
Panel B: Tax Repeal
Tax Repeal 74.392⇤⇤⇤ 121.564⇤⇤⇤ 28.831⇤⇤ 18.855
(21.838) (35.482) (13.174) (26.258)
High self-control ⇥ No Tax 18.850 -32.350 -14.235 1.359
(28.413) (46.351) (15.188) (44.991)
Households 842 355 1077 164
n 15084 6305 23598 3546
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK
data. The estimations are performed separately on the sample of panelists who respond “Somewhat agree” or
“Totally agree” to the statement “I am addicted to sugar” and “I am addicted to fat”, respectively. Controls
include household size, income, labor market status, number of kids, temperature, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10,
⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
previously consumed (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2002). If consumers with low self-control are
more habituated (because they underweigh the long-term health costs of sin good consump-
tion) and, thus, have larger withdrawal costs, they are less likely to reduce their consumption
when prices go up. In contrast, since withdrawal costs do not have to be incurred when
consumption is increased, a di↵erential response to tax cuts is not expected.
This result does not depend on a di↵erence in the initial habit stock by self-control. In
Appendix F, we build on the model of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002) and show theoretically
that an asymmetric response is also expected when the initial habit stock and self-control
are independent and consumers are forward-looking. In the model, consumers are aware that
a tax does not just change the instantaneous price but also all prices in the future. Since
consumers with low self-control discount the future (and, hence, the future price changes)
more, they react in general less strongly to tax changes. However, the di↵erential response is
predicted to be smaller for a tax cut compared to a tax hike since the tax hike induces high
self-control consumers to reduce their habit stock more.
To investigate empirically whether habit formation is a potential mechanism behind the
results, we first check if consumers with high and low self-control consider themselves to be
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addicted to sugar and fat. In Table 9, we show that self-control is associated with self-reported
addiction to these goods after controlling for demographic characteristics. We observe that
consumers with low self-control are substantially more likely to agree to the statements “I
am addicted to sugar/fat” and “I find it harder to establish healthy eating habits than to
establish unhealthy eating habits”.
Second, we investigate if self-control has heterogenous e↵ects among consumers who con-
sider themselves addicted to the taxed good. In Table 10, we split the sample into consumers
who agree that they are addicted to sugar (for the soft drink tax estimations) or fat (for the
fat tax estimations). Among those who report not to be addicted to sugar, there is a reduction
in purchases by both consumers with low and high self-control. Here, the di↵erential response
is smaller in magnitude and no longer significant. In contrast, among those who report being
addicted to sugar, consumers with high self-control respond significantly stronger to the tax
hike. Those with low self-control even slightly increase their soft drink purchases. For the fat
tax, we observe a similar pattern: Those who report not being addicted to fat reduce their
purchases irrespective of their level of self-control, while among those who report that they
are not addicted, only those with high self-control significantly reduce their purchases.
Overall, these results suggest that self-control is required to reduce sin good consumption
whereas self-control is not necessary for increasing sin good consumption. We find indication
that this relationship generates the observed pattern with a di↵erential response to increasing
taxes but no systematic di↵erential response to decreasing taxes.
6 Conclusion
In both policy debates and in the economic literature, it is often argued that sin taxes can help
consumers with low self-control to act more in accordance with their own long-run interest.
However, this requires that consumers with low self-control respond to tax changes by reducing
consumption. This paper presents evidence that consumers with low self-control respond
systematically less to increasing soft drink and fat taxes than do high self-control consumers.
However, we find no di↵erence between the groups when the tax is reduced, indicating that it is
not just a di↵erence in price elasticity between the groups. We show theoretical and empirical
evidence that this pattern can be explained by (rational) habit formation, an aspect largely
neglected in the existing literature. If the taxed good is habituating (which is reasonable for
many sin goods), sin taxes of modest magnitude may be less e↵ective than previously thought
in correcting internalities.
Our results suggest that other policy measures may be required to help consumers with
low self-control to act in accordance with their long-run interests. It is worth considering, for
example, time- and place-based restrictions regarding the sale of sugar sweetened beverages,
as many jurisdictions have implemented for alcohol. Governments may also consider limiting
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the amount of sugar that beverages are allowed to contain or think about a ban on advertising
sugary products.
It must be noted that sin taxes can still correct externalities on public health, even if
consumers with low self-control are not successfully targeted by these taxes. Sin taxes can
make those consumers, who do not reduce their purchases, compensate the arising social costs
of consumption. Furthermore, while consumers with low self-control may not respond to the
price incentives themselves, smart sin tax design can still improve the diets of individuals
with low self-control. If taxes are proportional to the harmful ingredient (e.g. sugar in soft
drinks), producers are incentivized to make their product less unhealthy, as documented for
the tiered soft drink tax in the UK (Public Health England, 2019). Since the Danish soft
drink tax was volumetric, this incentive was not given. Moreover, taxes that increase the
prices of the unhealthiest products the most may encourage consumers to substitute with less
unhealthy alternatives (Grummon et al., 2019).
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Appendix (for online publication)
A Derivation of optimal sin taxes
The following model closely follows O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) and Haavio and
Kotakorpi (2011) and derives the optimal tax formula in section 2.
An individual i in period t has intertemporal utility from consumption that is given by




Each period she receives instantaneous utility ut and future utility is discounted by time-
consistent discount factor   and by hyperbolic discounting factor  i that di↵ers between
individuals. If  i < 1, the agent has a preference for immediate gratification (low self-control)
and if  i = 1 the agent behaves time-consistent. For simplicity, we assume   = 1, i.e. there is
no time-consistent discounting.
The instantaneous utility can be expressed as
ut = v(xt)  c(xt 1) + zt(6)
and consists of the utility v(·) from consuming a sin good, e.g. soft-drinks, in the current
period xt, the health costs c(·) with c0(·) > 0 from having consumed soft-drinks in the past
xt 1 and utility from a numeraire good zt. The price of soft-drinks is p while the price of
the numeraire is normalized to one. Thus, the per-period budget constraint is pxt + zt = y,
where y is income.
Since decisions are independent from other periods, each period the agent chooses x such
as to maximize u(x⇤) = v(x⇤)    ic(x⇤) + z, which yields the first order condition v0(x⇤)  
 ic0(x⇤) = p. However, if the agent had perfect self-control she would maximize u(xo) =
v(xo)   c(xo) + z and consume according to the first order condition v0(xo)   c0(xo) = p. It
can immediately be seen that a present-biased consumer with   < 1 overconsumes soft-drinks
compared to their long-run optimal consumption xo. Assuming that taste for soft-drinks
v(x) is independent of self-control  , we can expect that consumers with low self-control ( )
consume on average more soft-drinks than consumers with high self-control ( ̄) since they
underweigh the costs.
A social planner may now decide to impose a tax t on soft-drinks in order to correct
for the internality that is due to the low self-control. The social planner redistributes the
tax revenues lump-sum back to consumers and the individual budget constraint becomes
(p + t)xt + zt = y + tx̄ where x̄ is the average soft-drink consumption in the economy. The





[v(xi)  c(xi) + (y + tx̄  (p+ t)xi)](7)














where @x̄@t is the average response in soft-drink consumption due to the tax change. Insert-
ing the demand condition that allows for imperfect self-control v0(x⇤)    c0(x⇤) = p + t and











B Factor structure of self-control scale
In order to extract the latent dimension of self-control that matters for food choices, we
perform a principal component factor analysis. Following the original study by Tangney
et al. (2004), we extract five factors. In Table B.1, we show the rotated factor loadings of
the five factors. The first factor (13.4 percent of the variance) measures a general capacity
for self-discipline and loads high on a variety of factors, e.g. “I blurt out whatever is on
my mind” (0.647). The second factor (9.1 percent of the variance) is related to healthy
habits and resistance against temptations. It has the highest loadings on “I eat healthy food”
(0.712), “I have many healthy habits” (0.708), “I am good at resisting temptations” (0.644),
and “I have a hard time breaking bad habits” (0.608). The third factor (7.4 percent of the
variance) is related to reliability, e.g. it has the highest loading on “I am always on time”
(0.738). The fourth factor (6.6 percent of the variance) relates to self-restraint and has the
highest loading on “I am self-indulgent at times” (0.620). The fifth factor (4.0 percent of
the variance) describes being impulsive and loads highest on “People would describe me as
impulsive” (0.552). Thus, the factor structure is very similar to that of Tangney et al. (2004).
B.1 Robustness of self-control factor
In order to make sure that the self-control factor is not merely picking up revealed preferences
about healthy food consumption, we check robustness to excluding the item “I eat healthy
foods” from the factor analysis. In Table B.3, we re-run the factor analysis without the
respective item and show the rotated factor loadings of the five factors. The table shows that
the factor loadings change slightly compared to Table B.1. Factor 2 now loads highest on “I
am good at resisting temptations” (0.695), “I have a hard time breaking bad habits” (0.694),
and “I wish I had more self-discipline” (0.623).
We conduct a median split using this newly generated self-control factor and re-run the
estimations for the soft drink tax and the fat tax. In Table B.4, we show the estimation results
for the soft drink tax. The results turn out to be similar compared to the main specification
in Table 6. The same holds true for the fat tax estimations in Table B.5, which yield similar
results compared to the main specification in Table 7. This leads us to conclude that the
results are not driven by an item in the self-control scale that captures revealed preferences
for healthy nutrition.
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Table B.1: Rotated factor loadings (varimax), N=2,387
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5
I am good at resisting temptations 0.213 0.644 0.109 0.022 0.051
(R) I have a hard time breaking bad habits 0.298 0.608 0.004 0.069 -0.224
(R) I am lazy 0.273 0.439 0.286 0.135 -0.299
(R) I often say inappropriate things 0.551 0.129 0.130 0.030 -0.003
I never allow myself to lose control -0.150 0.005 0.111 -0.152 0.533
(R) I do certain things that are bad for me,
if they are fun 0.205 0.231 0.055 0.539 0.036
(R) Getting up in the morning is hard for me 0.292 0.173 0.306 0.084 -0.405
(R) I have trouble saying no 0.476 0.234 0.029 -0.057 -0.218
(R) I change my mind fairly often 0.586 0.104 0.159 0.009 -0.154
(R) I blurt out whatever is on my mind 0.647 0.057 -0.011 0.063 0.105
I refuse things that are bad for me 0.114 0.347 0.152 -0.284 0.254
(R) I spend too much money 0.340 0.367 0.177 0.307 -0.024
I keep everything neat 0.082 0.258 0.512 0.005 0.088
(R) I am self-indulgent at times 0.074 0.029 -0.024 0.620 -0.030
(R) I wish I had more self-discipline 0.472 0.459 0.130 0.054 -0.142
I am reliable 0.087 0.058 0.468 -0.343 0.306
(R) I get carried away by my feelings 0.557 0.134 -0.062 0.151 0.043
(R) I do many things on the spur of the moment 0.330 -0.054 -0.054 0.500 0.190
(R) I don’t keep secrets very well 0.470 -0.041 0.215 0.045 -0.040
(R) I have worked or studied all night at the last minute 0.349 0.097 0.410 0.300 -0.208
I’m not easily discouraged 0.258 0.293 0.245 -0.514 0.014
(R) I’d be better o↵ if I stopped thinking before acting 0.527 -0.007 0.128 0.037 0.064
(R) Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from
getting work done 0.338 0.104 0.314 0.399 0.004
(R) I have trouble concentrating 0.550 0.178 0.230 -0.076 -0.253
I am able to work e↵ectively toward long-term goals 0.170 0.305 0.325 -0.408 0.122
(R) Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing
something, even if I know it is wrong 0.433 0.316 0.119 0.407 0.047
(R) I often act without thinking through all the
alternatives 0.575 0.198 0.106 0.186 0.220
(R) I lose my temper too easily 0.537 0.049 -0.042 0.010 0.029
(R) I often interrupt people 0.597 0.062 0.013 0.071 -0.027
I am always on time 0.010 -0.031 0.738 -0.011 -0.043
People can count on me to keep the schedule 0.048 0.072 0.719 -0.014 -0.042
(R) People would describe me as impulsive 0.232 -0.101 -0.050 0.307 0.552
People would say that I have an iron self-discipline 0.157 0.397 0.448 -0.157 0.083
I have many healthy habits -0.054 0.708 0.019 -0.061 0.021
I eat healthy foods -0.013 0.712 0.026 0.007 -0.015
(R) I sometimes drink too much alcohol 0.085 0.122 0.139 0.210 0.189
Notes: Table shows rotated factor loadings after principal component factor analysis (varimax rotation), using
GfK data. We extract five factors following the original study by Tangney et al. (2004). (R) indicates that
the item is reverse coded.
37
Table B.2: Correlations of self-control factors with characteristics and attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Body Mass Obesity Intention to “I should “I should eat
Index (BMI) (BMI>30) reduce weight eat less sugar” less animal fat”
Low SC (Factor 1) 0.494⇤ 0.032 0.089⇤⇤⇤ 0.085⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤
(0.283) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Low SC (Factor 2) 2.124⇤⇤⇤ 0.094⇤⇤⇤ 0.202⇤⇤⇤ 0.112⇤⇤⇤ 0.115⇤⇤⇤
(0.269) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Low SC (Factor 3) 0.453 0.026 0.021 -0.009 0.011
(0.283) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Low SC (Factor 4) 0.727⇤⇤ 0.035 0.018 0.034 0.025
(0.287) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Low SC (Factor 5) 0.175 -0.002 0.000 -0.063⇤⇤ 0.012
(0.288) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 26.021 0.175 0.620 0.483 0.354
Households 1237 1236 1197 1197 1197
Notes: Table shows results from regressing the dependent variable in the respective column on the self-control
factor and controls, using GfK data. The controls are income, age, education, labor market status, and
number of children. Columns (1) and (2) are based on weight and height data from 2011. BMI is calculated
as ([weight in kg]/[height in m]2). The dependent variable in column (3) is an indicator whether respondents
indicate in the 2013 survey that they would like to weigh at least 1 kg less. The dependent variable in columns
(4) and (5) are indicators whether respondents approve that they should eat “A lot less” or “A little less” sugar
or animal fat to eat healthier. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table B.3: Rotated factor loadings (varimax) without item “I eat healthy foods”, N=2,387
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5
I am good at resisting temptations 0.068 0.695 0.092 0.063 0.104
(R) I have a hard time breaking bad habits 0.158 0.694 -0.021 0.084 -0.175
(R) I am lazy 0.199 0.489 0.278 0.123 -0.315
(R) I often say inappropriate things 0.579 0.149 0.150 0.032 -0.084
I never allow myself to lose control -0.175 -0.016 0.108 -0.088 0.583
(R) I do certain things that are bad for me,
if they are fun 0.139 0.235 0.051 0.543 -0.046
(R) Getting up in the morning is hard for me 0.255 0.259 0.286 0.079 -0.373
(R) I have trouble saying no 0.357 0.430 -0.027 0.003 -0.084
(R) I change my mind fairly often 0.520 0.274 0.120 0.060 -0.086
(R) I blurt out whatever is on my mind 0.663 0.105 -0.001 0.094 0.065
I refuse things that are bad for me 0.016 0.419 0.130 -0.220 0.343
(R) I spend too much money 0.249 0.420 0.163 0.333 -0.031
I keep everything neat 0.043 0.267 0.511 0.025 0.077
(R) I am self-indulgent at times 0.028 0.030 -0.035 0.617 -0.095
(R) I wish I had more self-discipline 0.323 0.623 0.084 0.109 -0.055
I am reliable 0.133 0.022 0.492 -0.316 0.293
(R) I get carried away by my feelings 0.448 0.306 -0.112 0.233 0.146
(R) I do many things on the spur of the moment 0.242 0.055 -0.096 0.570 0.226
(R) I don’t keep secrets very well 0.494 0.018 0.215 0.067 -0.049
(R) I have worked or studied all night at the last minute 0.302 0.190 0.386 0.319 -0.203
I’m not easily discouraged 0.219 0.371 0.236 -0.476 0.098
(R) I’d be better o↵ if I stopped thinking before acting 0.528 0.069 0.121 0.080 0.079
(R) Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from
getting work done 0.299 0.147 0.303 0.427 -0.017
(R) I have trouble concentrating 0.495 0.330 0.199 -0.042 -0.190
I am able to work e↵ectively toward long-term goals 0.110 0.378 0.311 -0.359 0.203
(R) Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing
something, even if I know it is wrong 0.326 0.402 0.095 0.450 0.037
(R) I often act without thinking through all the
alternatives 0.523 0.269 0.098 0.245 0.211
(R) I lose my temper too easily 0.569 0.074 -0.025 0.018 -0.031
(R) I often interrupt people 0.631 0.091 0.031 0.071 -0.110
I am always on time 0.026 -0.010 0.732 0.002 -0.030
People can count on me to keep the schedule 0.047 0.094 0.715 -0.001 -0.036
(R) People would describe me as impulsive 0.239 -0.134 -0.040 0.365 0.506
People would say that I have an iron self-discipline 0.089 0.435 0.441 -0.121 0.121
I have many healthy habits -0.079 0.538 0.073 -0.094 -0.020
(R) I sometimes drink too much alcohol 0.090 0.066 0.160 0.206 0.090
Notes: Table shows rotated factor loadings after principal component factor analysis (varimax rotation), using
GfK data. We extract five factors following the original study by Tangney et al. (2004). The items exclude
the item “I eat healthy foods”. (R) indicates that the item is reverse coded.
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Table B.4: Soft-drink purchases in response to soft drink tax changes, alternative self-control
variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Tax hike
Tax hike -9.760 -8.929 -14.193 -3.699 -30.237 -26.118
(17.145) (20.590) (18.374) (19.419) (21.180) (25.090)
Tax hike
⇥ High self-control -53.468⇤⇤ -53.401⇤⇤ -51.129⇤⇤ -53.217⇤⇤ -44.849⇤⇤ -44.499⇤⇤
(21.176) (21.151) (21.639) (21.297) (21.965) (21.998)
⇥ High education -2.118 8.644
(20.034) (21.183)
⇥ Lacks knowledge 15.798 7.247
(32.826) (33.985)
⇥ High income -13.279 -16.493
(22.702) (24.716)
⇥ Unhealthy taste 35.925 34.603
(22.300) (22.621)
Households 1278 1278 1197 1278 1197 1197
Household Months 22197 22197 20887 22197 20887 20887
Panel B: Tax repeal
Tax repeal 94.734⇤⇤⇤ 99.421⇤⇤⇤ 93.242⇤⇤⇤ 92.433⇤⇤⇤ 89.750⇤⇤⇤ 88.894⇤⇤⇤
(19.479) (23.190) (20.642) (22.958) (24.982) (28.591)
Tax repeal
⇥ High self-control -19.776 -19.318 -13.012 -19.719 -11.542 -11.827
(24.348) (24.253) (24.680) (24.315) (26.075) (25.738)
⇥ High education -11.974 -20.484
(23.564) (25.449)
⇥ Lacks knowledge -16.730 -19.204
(32.489) (33.971)
⇥ High income 3.704 19.163
(23.862) (25.975)
⇥ Unhealthy taste -0.049 3.149
(26.183) (27.358)
Households 1278 1278 1197 1278 1197 1197
Household Months 22747 22747 21389 22747 21389 21389
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK
data. The dependent variable is monthly quantity in centiliters. The “High self-control” factor excludes the
item “I eat healthy foods”. “High education” means tertiary education (ref.: vocational education), “Lacks
knowledge” identifies consumers who agree to the statement “I believe I would make healthier food choices
if I had more information on how to eat healthy”, “High income” are in the top half of the distribution of
equivalized incomes, “Unhealthy taste” indicates that consumers agree to the statement “I believe I would
make healthier food choices if unhealthy food was less tasty”. Controls include household size, income, labor
market status, number of kids, temperature, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table B.5: Butter purchases in response to fat tax changes, alternative self-control variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Tax hike
Tax hike -24.601⇤⇤ -30.411⇤⇤ -20.796⇤ -23.832⇤ -11.570 -14.156
(10.650) (12.382) (11.630) (13.063) (13.476) (17.149)
Tax hike
⇥ High self-control -24.566⇤ -25.050⇤ -26.172⇤ -24.693⇤ -29.881⇤⇤ -31.531⇤⇤
(14.299) (14.288) (14.889) (14.303) (15.201) (15.312)
⇥ High education 14.713 16.078
(14.424) (15.279)
⇥ Lacks knowledge -25.859 -17.055
(22.688) (22.874)
⇥ High income -3.037 -4.040
(15.290) (16.192)
⇥ Unhealthy taste -27.513⇤ -25.455
(15.705) (15.621)
Households 1324 1324 1241 1324 1241 1241
Household Months 28162 28162 26504 28162 26504 26504
Panel B: Tax repeal
Tax repeal 30.531⇤⇤⇤ 31.155⇤⇤ 34.381⇤⇤⇤ 28.931⇤⇤ 33.939⇤⇤ 38.669⇤⇤
(11.406) (13.313) (12.450) (14.643) (14.336) (18.493)
Tax repeal
⇥ High self-control -17.866 -17.810 -19.790 -17.694 -19.527 -20.423
(13.872) (13.889) (14.385) (13.899) (14.444) (14.638)
⇥ High education -1.513 -9.522
(13.916) (14.618)
⇥ Lacks knowledge -12.674 -12.426
(20.090) (20.382)
⇥ High income 2.741 1.271
(15.750) (16.800)
⇥ Unhealthy taste -3.812 -1.652
(14.645) (14.841)
Households 1323 1323 1241 1323 1241 1241
Household Months 28829 28829 27144 28829 27144 27144
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK data.
The dependent variable is monthly quantity in grams. The “High self-control” factor excludes the item “I eat
healthy foods”. “High education” means tertiary education (ref.: vocational education), “Lacks knowledge”
identifies consumers who agree to the statement “I believe I would make healthier food choices if I had more
information on how to eat healthy”, “High income” are in the top half of the distribution of equivalized
incomes, “Unhealthy taste” indicates that consumers agree to the statement “I believe I would make healthier
food choices if unhealthy food was less tasty”. Controls include household size, income, labor market status,
number of kids, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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C Soft Drink Tax
C.1 Pass-through of soft drink tax to prices
Figure C.1: Average soft drink prices over time (based on Schmacker and Smed (2020))
Notes: Graph shows weekly average soft drink prices around the tax increase in January 2012 and the tax cuts
in July 2013 and January 2014, using GfK data. Dots represent weekly averages and the lines local polynomials
(rectangular weights and 26 week bandwidth). The vertical lines indicate the timing of tax changes. The graph
is reproduced from Schmacker and Smed (2020).
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C.2 Robustness of soft drink tax estimations
Figure C.2: Predicted values of monthly soft drink purchase quantity by self-control, without
household fixed e↵ects and demographic controls
Notes: Graph shows annual predicted values only controlling for household size, using GfK data. The shaded
areas represent 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered on the household level. The vertical
lines indicate the timing of tax changes.
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Figure C.3: Predicted values of monthly purchase quantity of untaxed beverages by self-
control
Notes: Graph shows annual predicted values only controlling for household size, using GfK data. The shaded
areas represent 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered on the household level. The vertical
lines indicate the timing of tax changes.
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Figure C.4: Permutation test for soft drink tax
(a) Tax increase
(b) Tax repeal
Notes: Graph shows the distribution of estimated interaction coe cients “Tax change x High self-control”
when randomly reshu✏ing the classification in high and low self-control 10,000 times. The red line shows the
estimated coe cient from the main specification. Source: GfK Consumertracking.
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Table C.1: Soft drink purchases in response to placebo tax changes by self-control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity
Tax Placebo -23.163 -8.343 -8.341 -21.928
(16.106) (16.153) (16.813) (16.870)
High self-control ⇥ Tax Placebo -3.234 -4.325 23.538 25.332
(20.326) (20.079) (20.690) (20.835)
Households 1171 1171 1260 1260
Household Months 20674 20674 21622 21622
Placebo January 2010 January 2010 January 2011 January 2011
Controls No Yes No Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK data.
The dependent variable is monthly quantity in centiliter. Controls include household size, income, labor market
status, number of kids, temperature, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table C.2: Soft drink purchases in response to soft drink tax changes, collapsed standard
errors
Tax hike Tax repeal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity
Tax Hike -10.564 -14.024 81.455⇤⇤⇤ 96.980⇤⇤⇤
(16.189) (16.401) (17.375) (19.741)
High self-control ⇥ Tax Change -54.873⇤⇤⇤ -52.789⇤⇤⇤ -13.449 -3.724
(20.345) (20.459) (22.955) (22.863)
Households 1278 1278 1278 1278
Observations 2532 2532 2543 2543
Controls No Yes No Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses, using GfK data. The
dependent variable is monthly quantity in centiliter. Controls include household size, income, labor market
status, number of kids, temperature, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Panel A: Tax Hike
Tax Hike 7.997 0.003 0.044
(11.441) (0.016) (0.069)
High self-control ⇥ Tax Hike -36.567⇤⇤ -0.051⇤⇤ -0.112
(14.804) (0.021) (0.085)
Households 467 467 391
Household Months 7881 7881 2454
Panel B: Tax Repeal
Tax Repeal 39.102⇤⇤⇤ 0.041⇤⇤ 0.104⇤
(14.230) (0.018) (0.062)
High self-control ⇥ Tax Repeal -10.256 0.003 0.027
(15.831) (0.023) (0.084)
Households 467 467 394
Household Months 8055 8055 2514
Sample Single HH Single HH Single HH
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK data.
In columns (1)the dependent variable is monthly quantity in centiliter. In columns (2) it is purchase incidence
in a given month. In columns (3) it is log-transformed quantity. Controls include household size, income, labor
market status, number of kids, temperature, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Panel A: Tax Hike
Tax Hike -36.123⇤⇤⇤ -0.030⇤⇤⇤ -0.064⇤⇤⇤
(10.787) (0.007) (0.024)
Self-control (cont.) ⇥ Tax Hike -28.620⇤⇤⇤ -0.018⇤⇤⇤ -0.042⇤
(10.572) (0.007) (0.024)
Households 1278 1278 1158
Household Months 22197 22197 9667
Panel B: Tax Repeal
Tax Repeal 92.517⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.143⇤⇤⇤
(13.906) (0.008) (0.025)
Self-control (cont.) ⇥ Tax Repeal -13.627 -0.005 -0.008
(14.333) (0.008) (0.023)
Households 1278 1278 1164
Household Months 22747 22747 9919
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK data.
In columns (1) the dependent variable is monthly quantity in centiliter. In columns (2) it is purchase incidence
in a given month. In columns (3) it is log-transformed quantity. Controls include household size, income, labor
market status, number of kids, temperature, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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D Fat tax
D.1 Pass-through of fat taxes to butter prices
In this section, we aim to show that the fat tax indeed had an e↵ect on the price of butter.
Figure D.1 illustrates the development of prices around the fat tax introduction and repeal.
The graph plots average weekly prices. It is apparent that during the time window when the
fat tax was enacted, prices for butter were higher than before and after.
In Table D.1 we quantify the extent of the price changes by regressing absolute and log-
transformed prices on a tax dummy while controlling for product fixed e↵ects. Since we use
a bandwidth of one year around the tax changes, the regression amounts to comparing the
average prices one year before the tax change to one year after the tax change. We observe
that prices per 100g of butter have increased by DKK 0.761 after the tax introduction and
have decreased by DKK 0.611 after the tax repeal. Hence, the magnitude of price changes is
indeed very similar for the tax introduction and the repeal.
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Figure D.1: Average butter prices over time
Notes: Graph shows butter prices around the tax increase in January 2012 and the tax cuts in July 2013 and
January 2014, using GfK data. Dots represent weekly averages. The vertical lines indicate the timing of tax
changes.
Table D.1: Butter prices in response to tax changes
Tax introduction Tax repeal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absolute price Log price Absolute price Log price
Tax change 0.761⇤⇤⇤ 0.151⇤⇤⇤ -0.611⇤⇤⇤ -0.124⇤⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.010) (0.051) (0.009)
Constant 4.905⇤⇤⇤ 1.546⇤⇤⇤ 5.758⇤⇤⇤ 1.710⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.005) (0.026) (0.005)
EAN fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 52198 52198 59123 59123
Notes: Table shows results for a regression of absolute price (in DKK per 100g) and relative price (the log of
absolute price) on the tax dummy and EAN (product code) fixed e↵ects, using GfK data. In all specifications
the sample includes one year before and one year after the respective tax change. Standard errors clustered
on EAN level in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
50
D.2 Robustness of fat tax estimations
Figure D.2: Predicted values of monthly butter purchase quantity by self-control, without
household fixed e↵ects and demographic controls
Notes: Graph shows annual predicted values only controlling for household size, using GfK data. The shaded
areas represent 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered on the household level. The vertical
lines indicate the timing of tax changes.
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Figure D.3: Predicted values of monthly butter purchase quantity by self-control
Notes: Graph shows annual predicted values after controlling for household and quarter fixed e↵ects and
controls (household size, income, labor market status, number of kids, temperature), using GfK data. The
shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered on the household level. The
vertical lines indicate the timing of tax changes.
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Figure D.4: Permutation test for fat tax
(a) Tax introduction
(b) Tax repeal
Notes: Graph shows the distribution of estimated interaction coe cients “Tax change x High self-control”
when randomly reshu✏ing the classification in high and low self-control 10,000 times. The red line shows the
estimated coe cient from the main specification. Source: GfK Consumertracking.
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Table D.2: Butter purchases in response to placebo tax changes by self-control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity
Tax Placebo 16.743⇤⇤⇤ 16.169⇤⇤⇤ -2.208 -3.170
(5.969) (5.908) (6.040) (6.031)
High self-control ⇥ Tax Placebo -0.011 -0.255 1.846 2.813
(8.250) (8.202) (8.000) (7.951)
Households 1284 1284 1217 1217
Household Months 26139 26139 25355 25355
Placebo January 2010 January 2010 October 2010 October 2010
Controls No Yes No Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK data.
The dependent variable is monthly quantity in grams. Controls include household size, income, labor market
status, number of kids, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table D.3: Butter purchases in response to fat tax changes, collapsed standard errors
Tax introduction Tax repeal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity
Tax Hike -20.494⇤ -20.908⇤ 23.544⇤⇤ 28.541⇤⇤
(10.588) (10.781) (10.135) (11.404)
High self-control ⇥ Tax Change -30.109⇤⇤ -30.226⇤⇤ -11.172 -10.514
(14.731) (14.925) (13.688) (13.767)
Households 1322 1322 1323 1323
Observations 2596 2596 2632 2632
Controls No Yes No Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses, using GfK data. The
dependent variable is monthly quantity in grams. Controls include household size, income, labor market status,
number of kids, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Panel A: Tax hike
Tax introduction -24.283⇤ -0.006 -0.044⇤⇤⇤
(13.699) (0.009) (0.016)
Tax introduction
⇥ Medium self-control -23.032 -0.017 -0.002
(18.110) (0.013) (0.022)
⇥ High self-control -17.317 -0.027⇤⇤ 0.008
(17.902) (0.013) (0.022)
Households 1324 1324 1297
Household Months 28162 28162 18026
Panel B: Tax repeal
Tax repeal 29.075⇤⇤ 0.015 0.050⇤⇤⇤
(14.301) (0.010) (0.018)
Tax repeal
⇥ Medium self-control -3.742 -0.002 -0.007
(17.159) (0.012) (0.022)
⇥ High self-control -20.020 0.011 -0.037⇤
(17.911) (0.013) (0.022)
Households 1323 1323 1302
Household Months 28829 28829 18782
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table shows OLS regression results with standard errors clustered on household level, using GfK data.
In columns (1) the dependent variable is monthly quantity in grams. In columns (2) it is purchase incidence in
a given month. In columns (3) it is log-transformed quantity. Controls include household size, income, labor
market status, number of kids, and quarter FE. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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E Bounding approach
To investigate the impact of potential selection on unobservables, we follow the approach
by Oster (2019). The coe cient of interest is the interaction between the tax change in-
dicator and the self-control indicator, ↵2. First, we estimate the baseline estimate ↵̇2 in a
fixed-e↵ects regression of purchases on the tax indicator and the tax indicator interacted with
the self-control indicator. Second, we estimate the controlled estimate, ↵̃2, from a regression
that includes the full set of controls and the tax dummy interacted with income, education,
nutritional knowledge, and unhealthy taste. We consider proportional selection on unobserv-
ables that goes in the same direction as selection on observables ( ̃ = 1) and in the opposite
direction ( ̃ =  1). The bound can then be approximated by
(10) ↵⇤2 ⇡ ↵̃2    ̃
(↵̇2   ↵̃2)(Rmax   R̃)
R̃  Ṙ
where Ṙ is the within R-squared from the baseline regression and R̃ is the within R-
squared from the controlled regression. Rmax is the highest possible R-squared and is set to
Rmax = min(2.2R̃, 1) following Hener et al. (2019). Hence, the movement in coe cients is
weighted by the movement in R-squared relative to the potential change in R-squared.
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Table E.1: Coe cient bounds based on Oster (2019)
Soft drink tax Fat tax
Tax hike Tax repeal Tax introduction Tax repeal
Baseline estimate ↵̇2 -58.370 -5.710 -30.118 -11.6059
(20.218) (23.317) (13.937) (13.4896)
Baseline Within R-squared Ṙ 0.0015 0.0038 0.0014 0.0002
Controlled estimate ↵̃2 -51.196 0.251 -34.573 -12.4877
(21.822) (24.464) (14.803) (13.9000)
Controlled Within R-squared R̃ 0.0034 0.0073 0.0069 0.0089
Bound ↵⇤2 for   = 1 -30.7514 8.7586 -48.2122 -12.3802
Bound ↵⇤2 for   =  1 -67.6385 -6.3235 -22.7227 -12.5806
Bounds include zero? No Yes No No
Notes: Table shows results for bounding approach based on (Oster, 2019) with Rmax = min(2.2R̃, 1), using
GfK data. The baseline estimate corresponds to the coe cient of “Tax change x High self-control” from a
fixed e↵ects regression of purchases on the tax dummy interacted with self-control. The controlled estimate is
obtained from a fixed e↵ects regression including the full set of controls and interactions with the tax dummy
as in the sixth column of Tables 6 and 7. The bounding estimates are computed using the Stata ado-file psacalc
(Oster, 2019).
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F Price Responsiveness in a Model of Habit Formation
In the empirical analysis, we find suggestive evidence that habit formation is a mechanism
behind the di↵erential response to sin taxes between high and low self-control individuals.
In the following, we derive results about the price responsiveness by self-control when ratio-
nal habit formation is taken into account. In such a model, habit formation and addiction
can be used interchangeably since they rest on the same mechanism: Consumption today
increases the utility from consumption in the future due to intertemporal complementarities.
If an individual is aware of this property and takes it into account, we call it rational habit
formation. The model of rational habit formation is based on the exposition in O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2002). From here on, we adopt their approach to model the discrete choice of an
agent to either engage in a habit-forming activity or not (i.e. an individual can consume or
abstain). However, unlike in that paper, we introduce heterogeneity in self-control and focus
on di↵erential responses to tax variation by self-control.
Agents get utility in each period t = (1, ..., T ) with T ! 1 from either consuming a sin
good (at = 1) or abstaining (at = 0). By consuming the sin good they build up a habit stock
k that evolves according to
(11) kt =  kt 1 + at 1.
The habit stock in period t depends on the stock in the previous period, which decays
with   2 [0, 1) and replenishes if the agents have consumed in the previous period (Becker
and Murphy, 1988). The instantaneous utility of consumption is given by




vt   pt   c(kt) if at = 1
 c(kt)  g(kt) if at = 0
and depends on an exogenous preference for the sin good vt, the level of habituation kt,
and the price pt. Consuming sin goods is associated with a negative internality (c(kt) > 0), i.e.
having consumed sin goods in the past has a negative e↵ect on utility today. The internality
costs of past consumption are incurred irrespective of today’s consumption as, for example,
the adverse health e↵ects of being obese. For simplicity, we assume the internality costs to
be linearly increasing in k with c0(kt) > 0 and c00(kt) = 0. Moreover, quitting consumption is
associated with withdrawal costs (g(kt) > 0), which are higher the more habituated an agent
is, i.e. consumption is habit-forming. We assume that the withdrawal costs increase with the
habit level (g0(kt) > 0) and are weakly convex (g00(kt)   0).
In this model, vt is exogenously given and assumed to be constant over time: vt = (v̄, ...).
The price pt can be changed by the policy-maker by changing the tax rate but the individual
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takes pt as given and assumes that it will not change in the future. In contrast, kt depends
on past decisions. Forward-looking agents anticipate that their current decisions will impact
their future utility and will maximize for all periods s in t, t+ 1, ..., T with T = 1:









 k⌧ 1 + 1) if at = 1
ut(at, kt) +  
PT
⌧=t+1  
⌧ tu⌧ (a⌧ ,  k⌧ 1) if at = 0
where in the first case the consumer decides to consume and in the second case to abstain
in period t. We assume that consumers follow the strategy to either consume forever or to
abstain forever. The reason is that if consumption is habit-forming (if g(kt) > 0), it becomes
harder to quit tomorrow compared to today. Hence, a consumer who decides to quit would
rather quit today than at some point in the future.11 An agent who consumes will eventually
reach the steady-state habit stock kmax ⌘
P1
t=1  
t 1 = 11   , while an individual who abstains
approaches kmin = 0. In the following, we consider the case of näıve present-biased consumers,
i.e. the consumers are not aware of their present-bias problem and believe they will behave
as time-consistent individuals from the next period on.12
Assume consumers di↵er in their initial habit level kti and in their self-control  i. Their
initial habit level kti is independently drawn from a distribution that is characterized by a
function K and their self-control  i is independently drawn from a distribution F . Both K
and F are continuous and have strictly positive density over their support   2 (0, 1] and
kt 2 [0, kmax], respectively. Given their habit level kti and self-control  i, a consumer would
decide to consume if the utility from consumption starting today (i.e. at = 1 for all periods)
exceeds the utility from abstaining starting today (i.e. at = 0 for all periods) :
(14) v̄   pt   c(kti) +  i
1X
⌧=t+1








Intuitively, an individual consumes the sin good if the utility from consumption, less the
price and the internality costs in the current and all discounted future periods, are weakly
11O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002) show that for stationary preferences this is indeed the only perception-
perfect strategy for time-consistent individuals with   = 1. For consumers with imperfect self-control (  < 1)
there is another perception-perfect strategy where they plan to consume once and abstain thereafter (although
they will not actually stop consuming). However, in this context, we do not consider the latter strategy.
12Näıve present-bias is a reasonable assumption for consuming soft-drinks as there are no e↵ective commit-
ment devices known that a sophisticated consumer could employ. Instead, time-inconsistent have an incentive
to circumvent commitment ex post (by buying soft drinks in any store). See Gottlieb (2008) for a discussion.
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larger than the internality and withdrawal costs incurred in this and the following periods
due to the current level of kti.
We ensure a cut-o↵ equilibrium in the sense that, for all kti, every individual (weakly)
above a certain threshold ( i    ̃) consumes the sin good (a = 1) and below the threshold
( i <  ̃) does not (a = 0). Formally, this threshold is defined by equation (14) with equality,
or equivalently, by
 ̃ =   v̄   pt + g(kt)P1
⌧=t+1  





While the numerator in (15) describes the utility from consumption in the current period
and is positive, the denominator describes the utility from consumption in all future periods
and is negative.13 Define the utility from future consumption by  .
To investigate how the cut-o↵ type changes with a surprising price change, we di↵erentiate




1 +  1    ̃
 
< 0(16)
For every kti, a price increase reduces the level of self-control, below which an individual
finds it still worthwhile to consume. The reason is that an increasing price decreases utility
from consumption today and in all future periods. Hence, we expect a tax hike to decrease
consumption and a tax cut to increase consumption.
In the following, we focus on the question whether consumers with high and low levels of
















To ensure existence and uniqueness, we assume that for every kt, an individual with   ! 0 consumes the sin
good (J(kt, ) > 0) and an individual with   = 1 does not (J(kt, ) < 0). If J(kt, ) is monotonically falling in
 , the cuto↵  ̃ exists and is unique. We know that this is fulfilled since the denominator in (15) is negative. The
proof is by contradiction: Suppose not. Since   2 (0, 1], we know that either the numerator or denominator
is positive while the other is negative. If the assumption was true, the numerator would be negative and the
denominator positive. But since   2 [0, 1), every individual summand in the denominator is smaller than
the numerator. However, then the numerator cannot be negative while the denominator is positive, which
contradicts the assumption.
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For every kti, a higher level of self-control implies a more negative price responsiveness.
The reason is that individuals with high self-control take the future price change more into
account. Hence, we predict that consumers with high self-control respond more to taxes than
consumers with low self-control.
Result 1. Consumers with high self-control are more likely to react to price changes than
consumers with low self-control.
Next, we are interested in the question if consumers react symmetrically to a tax hike and
a subsequent tax cut. Here, we have to take into account that the habit stock kt changes
from one period to the next. Since we expect more consumers with a high level of self-control
to respond to a tax hike (cf. Result 1), there are more high self-control consumers whose
habit stock decreases. To make predictions regarding the question whether the response to a
tax cut is symmetric, we have to evaluate how the price responsiveness depends on the habit
stock.








(1   ) 2 < 0(18)
The derivative is negative. Hence, the lower the habit stock, the less negative is the
price responsiveness. The intuition is as follows: Suppose an individual with ( i, kti) =
( ̃, kti) consumes. A tax is introduced that increases the price, leading the individual to stop
consuming. Hence, the habit stock kti goes down. In the next period, the tax is repealed,
leading the price to return to its original level. However, since the individual now has a lower
habit stock, she no longer finds it appealing to resume consumption again. The described
e↵ect is more pronounced for individuals with high self-control since, according to Result 1,
we expect them to respond more strongly to the tax hike.
Result 2. The di↵erence in price responsiveness between low and high self-control is smaller
when a tax cut follows a tax hike.
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